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One of the Ombudsman’s characteristics which commands
the attention of students of political power and bureaucracy
is the institution’s effectiveness despite minimal coercive
capabilities. 1 Unlike the newer versions, the Swedish and
Finnish Ombudsmen have the primarily vestigial authority to
prosecute administrators. The essence of the modem institu-
tion is the Ombudsman’s ability to investigate citizens’
complaints and recommend that bureaucratic decisions be
altered. Making such a recommendation is ordinarily the
most &dquo;negative situational sanction&dquo; the most &dquo;severe depri-
vation&dquo; with which the Ombudsman can threaten a depart-
ment. Many theorists would consider this to be his strongest
and perhaps only source of &dquo;power&dquo; (see Parsons, 1963: 90;
Lasswell and Kaplan, 1952: 76). Thus, the Ombudsman must
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establish a positive relationship with the bureaucrats whom
he superintends.
This paper reports upon an investigation of the character
of this relationship for the New Zealand Ombudsman, who
was adopted in 1962. The New Zealand official was given the
essential ingredients of the Danish version, and he was the
first non-Scandinavian Ombudsman. His success provided the
initial evidence that the institution was not dependent upon a
uniquely Scandinavian constellation of cultural and political
factors. Because of the New Zealand officer’s relative
longevity, which provides necessary historical perspective,
and because he has been the primary model for subsequent
Ombudsmen, as well as for the plethora of proposals, this
first Anglo-Saxon Ombudsman is particularly worthy of
study.2
The substantive aspects of the relationship treated here
include the perceptual context of the Ombudsman-depart-
mental nexus; a measurement of the bureaucrats’ psycho-
social distance from the Ombudsman; perceptions of the
Ombudsman’s impact upon the public service; evaluation of
the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction; and general affect for the
Ombudsman.
METHODOLOGY
Between May 1967 and August 1968, I personally inter-
viewed the permanent or department heads (permanent
secretaries in British parlance) of the following nineteen
government departments, ranked according to frequency of
Fellowship to New Zealand in 1966-1968. I am indebted to the many
New Zealand public officials who consented to be interviewed and to
Sir Guy Powles, the New Zealand Ombudsman, who has contributed so
much to his own investigations. In addition, John Roberts and Don
McAllister, my former colleagues at the Victoria University of
Wellington, provided various kinds of assistance. William B. Gwyn of
Tulane University commented usefully upon an earlier draft.
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complaints against them to the Ombudsman; the figure after
each is the number of complaints recorded in the Ombuds-
man’s Report for 1967: Social Security 438, Inland Revenue
212, Education 177, Customs 142, State Services Commis-
sion 130, Health 122, State Advances Corporation 112,
Labor 112, Works 107, Justice 106, Police 95, Post Office
90, Railways 82, Superannuation 70, Agriculture 28, Trans-
port 28, Treasury 14, External Affairs 9, Government
Printer, 1.
The first thirteen were chosen because their departments
were those against which there had been the most com-
plaints. The six additions were chosen either because their
departments also had substantial experience with the Om-
budsman, because their departments were for other reasons
intrinsically important, or because they were particularly well
regarded as experienced and knowledgeable public servants.
Usually more than one reason was operable.
A subsidiary purpose of the investigation was to determine
if the department’s extent of interaction with the Ombuds-
man affected the respondent’s perceptions of him. It was
arbitrarily decided that respondents whose departments had
more than 100 complaints against them would be dubbed
&dquo;high interactors&dquo; while those having fewer would be &dquo;low
interactors.&dquo; Thus, approximately equal subgroups of ten and
nine, respectively, were created. Because of the small cells
often created, the subsequent analysis usually reports dif-
ferences only when they are clearly delineated.
The interviews were usually at least an hour in length and
ranged from about forty-five minutes to two and one-half
hours. The strategy used was to attempt to postpone the
scheduled interview with the permanent head until other
junior officers-usually those who actually handled the flow
of work with the Ombudsman and other appeals agents-had
been interviewed, relevant files had been examined, and
reports and the like had been collected. Sometimes, however,
this was not possible when a minister’s secretary or another
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permanent head scheduled the next appointment so close
that there was little time for preliminaries. The dual
reasoning behind the strategy was that this procedure would
make it easier to interpret and sometimes even to check the
truth of replies to questions; therefore, it was an attempt to
increase the interviewer’s credibility. It was hypothesized
that a permanent head might respond differently to an
interviewer whom he knew had already done considerable
research in his department than to one whom he might regard
as an ignorant American with a long list of tiresome and
possibly irrelevant questions.
THE PERCEPTUAL CONTEXT
Before exploring the parameters of the permanent heads’
orientations toward the Ombudsman, it is necessary to set
the scene. Specifically, the relationship between the bureau-
cracy’s administrative values and those of the Ombudsman
must be probed. Furthermore, structural and attitudinal
aspects of the Ombudsman’s rank require investigation.
SHARED VALUES
Talcott Parsons (1968: 437) has proclaimed: &dquo;The most
important single condition of the integration of an inter-
action system is a shared basis of normative order.&dquo; Prior to
the appointment of the Ombudsman, New Zealand’s civil
service was conceded to be efficient, and such values as
honesty, fairness, equality, justice, and the like were widely
distributed. Certainly, nothing even approaching the celebrity
of Britain’s (mild by American standards) Crichel Down
scandal of 1954 had been suggested in New Zealand. The
Ombudsman was established not to alter the value system but
to supplement the already existing value-maintaining agents.
One indication of the extent to which these values are shared
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can be found in the department heads’ responses to the
following attitude statement: &dquo;As one of the effects of
modem government, we have to expect that not every
grievance can be remedied.&dquo; Sixteen (84%) disagreed, and
none strongly agreed with it.
Another question’s results provide further insights: &dquo;How
would you evaluate the possible agencies open to the citizen
with a complaint against the government? First, what do you
think is the most effective action the citizen can take?&dquo; This
was not a difficult question for them to answer. Fifteen
(79%) volunteered that appealing to the department itself
was the citizen’s most effective recourse. The following
quotations are representative:
- We rectify genuine grievances that come to us. There is no profit
in doing something stupid or wrong.
- You must expect errors in a department such as ours when we
have thousands of daily contacts with the public. We make them
right.
- What the citizen should always do is to go to the local office
where the decision was made and ask for a hearing; it will be
disposed of there.
- If we have done a man an injustice in one of our offices-this is
almost always at the lowest level-why, we ought to be given the
first chance to correct it.
Conflicts between departments and the Ombudsman do
not arise over competing values, but rather over competing
interpretations of how to implement the shared values.
Although such competition may sometimes become fairly
intense, the &dquo;subjective psychological costs of compliance&dquo;
(Dahl, 1963: 43) with the Ombudsman are low; this basic
congruence of values is an important and perhaps vital
component of the Ombudsman’s authority.
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HIERARCHICAL AMBIGUITY
The Ombudsman stands outside the traditional flow of
authority which stems downward from the minister, through
the permanent head, into the department at large. Although
he interposes himself into that traditional relationship, his
power does not extend to the nullification of administrative
decisions. He may only recommend changes; this puny
power, which is not at all congruent with his sweeping
warrant for investigations, may be appealed by the depart-
ment to their minister, the prime minister, and, ultimately, to
Parliament.3
It would be surprising if the Ombudsman’s structurally
ambiguous position were not reflected in the department
heads’ perceptions. Perceived rank, which correlates highly
with willingness to respect an authority figure (see Hopkins,
1964: 157-182), was probed by the following open-ended
question: &dquo;What are your ideas on the Ombudsman’s true
position in the political system? How important is he as
compared with some other officials, such as a Supreme Court
Judge, the Solicitor-General, an M.P., a Minister, a Depart-
ment Head?&dquo;
It is clear from the replies that the Ombudsman is highly
respected, and he was compared to a Supreme Court
Judge-an eminently respected official in New Zealand-more
often than to any other. Although many respondents were
fascinated by the question, and several mulled it over at
length, most were unable to formulate an answer! These
replies were characteristic: &dquo;It’s difficult to define; he’s a very
different type.&dquo; &dquo;He’s unique; I don’t know who to compare
him to,&dquo; or &dquo;Well, he must fit in somewhere, but it’s hard to
say just where,&dquo; Thus, the fact that the Ombudsman and
New Zealand bureaucrats share basic norms would seem to
predispose them toward perceptions and actions favorable to
him. However, the structural and attitudinal ambiguities of
his authority cloud those expectations.
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MEASUREMENT OF BUREAUCRATS’ PSYCHOSOCIAL
DISTANCE FROM OMBUDSMAN
The concept of social distance attempts to measure
&dquo;grades and degrees of understanding and intimacy&dquo; (see
Goode and Hatt, 1952: ch. 16). The usual measurement
technique is a scale which defines an affective continuum.
However, the existing scales were inappropriate, and it did
not prove feasible to develop a scale which could measure the
bureaucrats’ social distance from the Ombudsman. Instead,
three individual questions investigated this dimension.
INCIDENCE OF THOUGHTS OF OMBUDSMAN
The first inquired:
&dquo;In your day-to-day work how often would you say
you have occasion to think of the Ombudsman?&dquo;
Eleven replied that they very seldom thought of him. One
said, &dquo;Never! Except in 1966 when I took over, I rang him up
and assured him of my cooperation.&dquo; Another assured the
interviewer, &dquo;He’s no concern to us at all.&dquo; A senior head
said, &dquo;To be perfectly frank, I don’t think of him. I’m a
lawyer and in our training we get a lot of ethics.&dquo; It is
interesting that 70% of the high interactors contended that
they seldom or never thought of the Ombudsman as
compared with only 40% of the low interactors. This appears
to be a classic instance of the defense mechanism of
displacement.
Three respondents said they sometimes thought of him in
dealing with specific cases as the following quotations
indicate:
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Only a month ago a case came up, a staff matter; I said, if we
decide it this way and he takes it to the Ombudsman, we won’t
have a leg to stand on.
About six times a year. I usually think of him when I explain to a
junior member of the staff why something isn’t on.
Three others said they thought of him only in connection
with the work they had to do to answer his letters; one of
them said that he only thought of the Ombudsman at the
moment he signed his officers’ replies. Only two claimed to
think of him often.
DISPOSITION OF OMBUDSMAN’S REPORTS
The next question was:
&dquo;What do you do about the Ombudsman’s
Annual Reports?&dquo;
Subsequent probes made it clear that the objective was to
gather a variety of reactions to the Reports. Seven of the
respondents had no apparent interest in them; as would be
expected, six of them were low interactors. One said,
&dquo;They’re water under the bridge, why should I be in-
terested ?&dquo; Another replied that he had not seen the most
recent Report (then six months old) and said, &dquo;You’ve got it
there in your bag, let’s see how we did.&dquo; However, the
remaining 64% did look at the Reports. Six of them said they
checked their rating with him; one specifically mentioned
that while he read them he did not send them out to his
officers: &dquo;They are not waiting with bated breath for the
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result.&dquo; Another took just the opposite view and circulated
them in all the district offices: &dquo;It’s good to familiarize them
with situations of complaint. He has wasted a lot of our time,
but that’s all part of the caper.&dquo; Six others (five were high
interactors) regularly scrutinized the Reports and also ob-
jected to the Ombudsman’s scorekeeping of &dquo;justified&dquo; cases.
For example, one fumed, &dquo;This score is inflated, because
most of these people hadn’t complained to us first. I am
sensitive to this because I want it to be known that we do
what is right.&dquo;4
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF OMBUDSMAN
Twelve of the department heads were asked the final social
distance question, &dquo;Do you know Sir Guy Powles person-
ally ?&dquo; Of those, seven said they did, and three of them said
they knew him prior to his appointment. One had worked in
the same law firm with him at the beginning of their careers.
Only two flatly said that they did not know him. Three
others who did not feel that they knew Sir Guy personally
said they had met him. One of them commented that he
occasionally met Sir Guy at cocktail parties, and they made
small talk without really talking about their jobs. Thus, the
majority of those asked felt that they had at least some
personal linkage with the Ombudsman.
THE OMBUDSMAN’S PERCEIVED IMPACT UPON THE
PUBLIC SERVICE
According to the Ombudsman’s most recent Report (for
1967) at the time interviewing began, his impact upon the
government departments would appear to be quantitatively
minor. An analysis of the Report reveals that, even for the
high interactors, a mean of only 17.5 cases per department
had been classified &dquo;considered justified&dquo; from the Ombuds-
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man’s inception in 1962. The mean was only 5 cases per
department for the low interactors. Of course, these few
cases may have been considered quite important by the
departments, or they may have been sorely irritated by his
other investigations which were classified as &dquo;not justified,&dquo;
&dquo;declined,&dquo; &dquo;discontinued,&dquo; or &dquo;withdrawn.&dquo; The analysis
turns to the Ombudsman’s perceived impact upon the Civil
Service.
RELATIONSHIP WITH MINISTER
A matter considered crucial to many is the Ombudsman’s
impact upon the traditionally sacrosanct institution of
ministerial responsibility. Permanent heads were asked:
&dquo;What effect has the Ombudsman had on your
relationship with your minister?&dquo;
Several replies were quite interesting, and it was often
apparent that the subject had never been thought of.
Supplementary questions probed into various aspects of the
relationship, especially whether they might have become
more careful in their advice to their ministers. One carefully
thought out negative reply was:
No, I don’t worry about the Ombudsman. I give the minister the
various options, but still make a firm recommendation. Of course,
I take his preferences into account, but the Ombudsman doesn’t
figure in. We have mentioned the Ombudsman probably two or
three times since 1962, but we have never discussed any specific
case.
Another commented that there had been no effect, but that
just yesterday in discussing a difficult case his minister had
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said, &dquo;I wish he’d take this to the Ombudsman and get it off
our plates.&dquo; Some of the respondents were defensive, as if the
question suggested that they might let illegitimate factors
influence their advice.
In a different vein, a head of an important but not very
&dquo;political&dquo; department said, &dquo;My time with my minister is
extremely limited. We wouldn’t spend it talking about the
Ombudsman.&dquo; A very &dquo;political&dquo; colleague agreed that the
Ombudsman had had no effect on his relationship with the
minister, but added,
I can get very annoyed with the Ombudsman, of course. I worry
about to what extent he can go into a case and my advice and the
minister’s decision. I don’t know how far he can go and don’t
think he does either. He has such wide powers. Even so, I would
never think of getting a direction from my minister; that would
be wrong in principle.
Although four of the group felt the Ombudsman had had
some effect on their relation with their minister, only two
gave any indication that the effect might be in the direction
of weakening the aura of trust and responsibility which is
supposed to be the key to that relationship. One of them
said, &dquo;Once or twice we have been quite annoyed. He evades
his jurisdiction and examines the minister’s decision by
looking at our advice. We think he has made some mistakes
and that it is our duty to fight back.&dquo;’
A radically different effect was mentioned by a colleague
who at first denied any impact:
I have asked the Minister to put something in writing to put it out
of the Ombudsman’s reach so he couldn’t investigate it. Right
now I can’t think of an example, but it has happened once or
twice.
Only one mentioned using this as a ploy to gain immunity
from the Ombudsman. More of them specifically said that no
such effect had resulted. Finally, one highly respected officer
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mentioned an interesting possibility that was not expressed
by any of the others:
What worries me is the right of the Ombudsman to examine the
department’s advice to a minister. This doesn’t worry me because
of the possibility of exposing departmental machinations, but
because sometimes ministers’ decisions are made against depart-
mental advice. I think it would be damaging to democracy if the
public were to know (say, in the case of a tragedy) that in order
to cut costs the minister made a technical decision against the
advice of his experts in the field.
EFFECTS UPON DEPARTMENT’S POLICIES
The following item requested:
&dquo;What effect has the Ombudsman had on your
department’s policies?&dquo;
Although almost one-third agreed that the Ombudsman
had had an effect upon their department’s policies, in almost
every case that agreement was halting. For example, one
replied:
None, the cases he has taken up have been predominantly sort of
personal cases. No.... There was one thing that could be called
policy that we changed as a result of his investigation. Another
one may have seemed to have changed. On another we made sure
that the ruddy politicians understood the reasons for our policy.
Another permanent head admitted that the Ombudsman
had had an effect on &dquo;some details, some inconsistencies in
minor regulations.&dquo; He added, &dquo;The Ombudsman’s inquiries
have sharpened us up on a few things. These things he forces
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us to rethink are minor, but still those small matters are
important.&dquo; From the other point of view, a new permanent
head retorted, &dquo;No. None whatever. Very definitely not!&dquo; A
more experienced colleague replied, &dquo;No, we have varied our
decisions and made exceptions for him, but I don’t think he
has clean-bowled us yet (but you aren’t a cricketer).&dquo; Most
simply contended that there had been no effect on policy
matters.
DEPARTMENTAL MEMORANDA ON OMBUDSMAN
Another item designed to measure a specific impact was:
&dquo;Have any special directives on the Ombudsman
gone out in this department?&dquo;
Seven replied no, and some of these were defensive about
the suggestion that it was possible that something should be
so seriously wrong in their department that internal comment
should be necessary. One replied tersely, &dquo;Quite clearly, no!&dquo;
A colleague agreed, &dquo;No! I deliberately do not use him as a
bogyman. I have good people in my department and don’t
need to scare them.&dquo; However, six (as would be expected,
four were high interactors.) reported that they had sent
memoranda to their staff as a result of the Ombudsman’s
investigations-memoranda on such matters as recording
telephone conversations and speeding the flow of corre-
spondence. One confided, &dquo;I did use the Ombudsman to get
my people to answer their mail quickly. I told them you
must have at least an interim reply to citizens within two
weeks because if you don’t they may complain to the
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Ombudsman or the Minister and that will give you more
work.&dquo; Three respondents professed not to know and said to
ask their staff.
EFFECT UPON DEPARTMENTAL STAFF
Further attempting to measure the Ombudsman’s depart-
mental impact, I asked:
&dquo;What effect has the Ombudsman had on your staff?&dquo;
About half maintained that the Ombudsman’s existence
had made no difference to their staff. Several were quite
defensive, as the following examples suggest, &dquo;We only work
on the merits of the case. We don’t work in terms of the
Ombudsman.&dquo; Another agreed and added that &dquo;It’s only the
chap who wants to get the last drop who complains to him.&dquo;
Four permanent heads felt that the Ombudsman made no
real difference to their staff but that there was a general
awareness of him. They talked of a general consciousness of
him and of a psychological awareness.
Six of the officials thought the Ombudsman had had an
effect such as the following:
It would be hard to prove, but the fact that your treatment of a
specific case may now be scrutinized by an outsider is bound to
have an effect. I’m not talking about a big effect just being more
careful to record other files and telephone calls and generally
being more precise and meticulous. Our people don’t lose any
sleep over him.
One replied that he thought the Ombudsman had been
useful in &dquo;keeping my bureaucrats in line,&dquo; but the following
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balanced view is more representative: &dquo;He has probably had
the effect of making some of the staff more careful about
making decisions, especially people with technical training
who were promoted to administrative positions. But on the
rest of the staff he has made little difference.&dquo;
It is important to note that none answered this question in
terms of the Ombudsman having the stifling effect of making
the staff more cautiously cling to established rules and
procedures. Nor were increased paperwork and delay men-
tioned, although the administrative burden of replying to the
Ombudsman was commented upon a few times in answering
other questions.
IMPACT UPON DEPARTMENTAL PUBLIC RELATIONS
The final departmental effect question was, &dquo;What effect
has the Ombudsman had on your relationships with the
public?&dquo; Seventy-five percent (fourteen) did not perceive any
effect from the Ombudsman. The following statement would
probably be subscribed to by the majority: &dquo;We figure that
we have at least four million face-to-face contacts with the
public each year. The Ombudsman would be brought into an
infinitesimally small number of them.&dquo; The five who per-
ceived that the Ombudsman had an effect upon their
relationships with the public were all high interactors, and all
saw the Ombudsman as helpful to public relations! One
dissenter exalted, &dquo;He puts us in the clear so often and tells
our toughest customers to stop grizzling that I wouldn’t stop
people from complaining if I could.&dquo; Echoing a similar
sentiment, a colleague speculated, &dquo;This is pure guesswork,
but the Ombudsman has good press coverage and, since most
of our complaints are not upheld, this probably helps our
image.&dquo; It seems highly significant that none of the respond-
ents expressed the view that the existence of the Ombudsman
had acted as a magnet to draw out potential complainants
and increase bothersome work.
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EFFECTS UPON OTHER DEPARTMENTS
In addition to measuring the Ombudsman’s impact upon
their own department, the following question was posed:
&dquo;Aside from your own department, what do you feel has
been the overall impact of the Ombudsman on the public
service?&dquo; Five of them claimed to have no knowledge about
what went on in other departments-particularly with regard
to something as esoteric as the Ombudsman. A representative
comment from those is, &dquo;I don’t know that I’ve heard
anyone else mention him; he just causes letter-work.&dquo; Only
one asserted that he had no effect, and it is significant to
observe that only one indicated that he felt that the
Ombudsman had made some civil servants overly cautious.
The remainder thought they perceived-albeit dimly-some
positive consequences. Four thought, in the words of one,
that his effect has been &dquo;to show that he was not needed. He
does cause us a lot of work. But I suppose he may be useful
for some other departments.&dquo; The largest single number,
eight, suggested some effect on decision-making. One com-
mented, &dquo;It’s a hard question, but perhaps with your decision
there’s a note of additional care; it’s a negative role.&dquo; A
colleague commented more positively, &dquo;It’s a good experi-
ment ; he keeps the departments on their toes and counters
the tendency toward arbitrary decisions which may adversely
affect citizens. The public servant always has the notion that
he is there.&dquo;
EVALUATION OF THE OMBUDSMAN’S JURISDICTION
The data in Table I record the responses of the permanent
heads to four attitude questions on the Ombudsman’s
jurisdiction.6 6 The first was stated rather boldly, and it
appeared that most of them felt that the Ombudsman’s
truncated jurisdiction did not prevent him from doing &dquo;a lot
more good.&dquo; It might be hypothesized that civil servants
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TABLE 1
DEPARTMENT HEADS’ RESPONSES TO ATTITUDE
STATEMENTS ON OMBUDSMAN’S
JURISDICTION (n = 19)
a. Two &dquo;Don’t know&dquo; responses to this statement are excluded from the analysis.
would resent the apparent discrimination the Ombudsman’s
Act prescribed in which their advice to the minister but not
his decisions could be investigated. However, there was little
agreement that the Ombudsman should be given the addi-
tional jurisdiction! It seems that their perception of the
proper constitutional roles outweighed thoughts of personal
advantage. Not a single respondent agreed that it would be
desirable to filter complaints through Members of Parliament,
and the rate of disagreement was the strongest of the four
questions. Finally, there was disagreement that, like the
British Ombudsman, theirs should be stripped of a large part
of his powers by removing discretionary decisions from his
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jurisdiction. This seems to be an important indicator of his
acceptance in the system.
Thus, the permanent heads were unwilling to accede to
any of the proposed alterations of the Ombudsman’s juris-
dictions. What is most apparent from the table is that in each
case the high interactors disagreed more strongly than the
low group. Their consistency in opposing not only expan-
sions, but also contractions-in spite of their greater experi-
ence-is striking and indicative of positive affect for the
Ombudsman.
GENERAL AFFECT FOR THE OMBUDSMAN
Table 2 contains the responses to seven statements
designed to probe the parameters of department heads’
attitudes toward the Ombudsman. Disagreement with the
first, which advocated Parliament’s keeping a closer watch on
the Ombudsman, was quite strong-mean = 4.95 for the
entire group. That high rate of disagreement and the even
slightly higher one for the next item, which accused the
Ombudsman of empire-building, at least indicated that the
department heads did not perceive the Ombudsman as a
dangerous intruder in their midst. In spite of occasional
threats from civil servants about repetitious work caused by
the Ombudsman, there was disagreement with the description
of the Ombudsman’s complainants as &dquo;quarrelsome people
with no real complaint.&dquo;&dquo;
The strongest rate of disagreement came in response to the
fourth item, that the Ombudsman was too foreign for New
Zealand. Nevertheless, it is clear from the mean for item five
that department heads believed that the Ombudsman was
transferred from Scandinavia and was not &dquo;basically a native
product.&dquo; The means for this statement reflect by far the
greatest split between high and low interactors. Probably
viewing the Ombudsman as a &dquo;foreigner&dquo; was a way of
displacing frustrations created by their frequent interaction.
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TABLE 2
DEPARTMENT HEADS’ MEAN RESPONSES
TO OMBUDSMAN ATTITUDE STATEMENTS (n = 19)
a. One &dquo;Don’t know&dquo; response to these statements is excluded from the analysis.
It also seems surprising that the permanent heads would so
strongly refuse to identify the Ombudsman as a partisan
matter. The fact that they do not may mean that they act as
if it is a permanent institution that must be reckoned with
rather than an ephemeral one. (The National Party, which
instituted the Ombudsman, has held power continually since
then.) However, they only slightly agreed that the Ombuds-
man acted as their conscience. Taking into account the
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defensiveness reported in responses to earlier questions, an
even stronger response had been expected. Considering item
five as somewhat of an exception, the table offers striking
evidence of the attitudinal agreement between the high and
low interactors. The mean deviation between the two groups
on all seven statements is only .4 of a scale point.
The department heads’ ordering of the Ombudsman
attitude statements listed in Tables I and 2 can also be
usefully analyzed in another fashion. It is possible to analyze
all eleven statements in the two tables on an internal basis,
using measures of dispersion. The eleven statements were
designed to reveal a coherent set of attitudes about the
Ombudsman, and they are here interpreted as a pro-
Ombudsman index.’ Each department head’s answers on the
eleven items were simply totaled without weighting; the
mean was found,9 and that number became his index score.
Thus, in order to score most favorably on the index (one
would be the most pro-Ombudsman score possible and six
the most anti-Ombudsman), the respondent would have to
consistently and strongly favor the extension of the Ombuds-
man’s jurisdiction, oppose its limitation, oppose Parliament’s
closer supervision, defend the Ombudsman’s attraction of
publicity, underscore his domesticity, defend the genuineness
of the complainants’ grievances, emphasize the Ombudsman’s
independence of party politics, view him as a conscience over
the bureaucracy, and endorse his success in becoming
integrated into New Zealand politics.
The requirements of the above list are so demanding that
one would not expect even extreme advocates of the
Ombudsman to place each statement in the most pro-
Ombudsman position; but, in the result, there was one
perfect score. Likewise, it would be surprising if even the
Ombudsman’s most adamant opponent were strongly op-
posed to him on every statement; hence, at the other end of
the range, the most anti-Ombudsman score was only 4.0-two
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full scale points below the maximum. The mean pro-Ombuds-
man index score for permanent heads was 2.86. This
relatively favorable score confirms the earlier pattern of
responses on individual questions. Only three permanent
heads-all of whom were high interactors-had scores over
3.5, so that they would be counted as anti-Ombudsman.
There are differences between the index scores (3.1 and
2.6 respectively) of the high and low interactors. This
difference seems to be a real one, although it is not possible
to denote statistical significance to it. This finding is
supported by the following correlation: First, the nineteen
departments were ranked from highest to lowest in terms of
actual interaction with the Ombudsman. Then this rank was
compared with the permanent head’s score on the pro-
Ombudsman index. For comparison purposes, rankings on
the index scores were from most anti-Ombudsman to most
pro-Ombudsman. Using Spearman’s rho, the coefficient of
rank correlation was .4.1 ° Thus, there is a positive relation-
ship that appears to be moderately strong between inter-
action and decreased affect for the Ombudsman. Of course,
these data do not prove causation, but they-along with the
other results and impressions-lead in that direction. Certain-
ly we have a stronger justification for this assumption than
that usually assumed* in the popular saw, &dquo;Propinquity breeds
contempt.&dquo;
CONCLUSIONS
This investigation of the qualitative 1 1 aspects of inter-
action between New Zealand’s bureaucrats and the Ombuds-
man has revealed that department heads generally share
positively affective orientations toward the Ombudsman. The
investigation has been a particularly interesting one, because
its context includes shared norms, but ambiguous authority.
To the extent that we have measured the department heads’
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social distance from the Ombudsman, it is at least clear that
he is not considered a pariah. Few felt that the Ombudsman
had had any appreciable-much less a deleterious-effect
upon the public service. While it is evident that there was no
belief that the transfer of the Ombudsman had been a
particular boon to the departments, it is highly significant
that not one believed that it had been a great mistake. 1 2
Clearly, the permanent heads were not preoccupied by the
Ombudsman. There was, for example, no enthusiasm for
either extending or curtailing his jurisdiction. However, it
developed that many of them were &dquo;Ombudsman-conscious&dquo;
when the need arose; the results of the pro-Ombudsman
index showed that they harbored generally favorable atti-
tudes toward the institution.
Affect for the Ombudsman tended to decrease as inter-
action with him increased. However, this decrease was
relative; it must be recalled that only three of the nineteen
scores extended into the anti-Ombudsman range. Considering
the total characteristics of the permanent heads’ perceptual
relationships with the Ombudsman, they would be best
described as respectful and responsive, if not enthusiastic and
extensive. These New Zealand findings indicate that the
introduction of an Ombudsman does not necessarily produce
administrative conflict. Largely impressionistic Scandinavian
research (Gellhorn, 1967; Hill, forthcoming) is corroborative.
However, further comparative research into such Ombuds-
man systems as Tanzania’s and incipient ones in the
American states is necessary to attempt to determine what
part of the Ombudsman’s success is due to shared cultural
factors and what part is explained by the institution’s
intrinsic nature.
NOTES
1. Since its invention in Sweden in 1809, the institution of the Ombudsman
has become au courant. It has been transferred to the foreign soils of Finland,
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Denmark, Norway, New Zealand, Guyana, Tanzania, Great Britain, Northern
Ireland, the Canadian Provinces of Alberta, New Brunswick, and Quebec, and the
American states of Hawaii and Nebraska. In addition, Ombudsman Bills have been
introduced in most American state legislatures, a host of Ombudsmen operate on
the local level, at least fifty Ombudsmen exist on the campuses of American
colleges and universities, and similar officers have been proposed for large
corporations, such as General Motors. See Anderson (1969) and Hill (forth-
coming).
2. For general overviews of the New Zealand Ombudsman’s entire operation
see Gellhorn (1967: ch. 3) and Hill (1968).
3. The Ombudsman has been widely proposed in developing countries as an
anti-corruption device. While this will be an interesting experiment, grounds exist
for questioning whether an Ombudsman could by himself alter a system’s
established value pattern.
4. A subsequent question asking whether they recalled as particularly
significant any of the Ombudsman’s cases with other departments was met with
blank stares. Not one of them was sufficiently interested to read about or
comment upon other departments’ cases.
5. The Ombudsman does not have jurisdiction over the ministers’ inde-
pendent decisions. He may, however, examine departments’ recommendations to
him.
6. The respondents were asked to rank each statement on a continuous scale
from one (indicating strongly agree) to six (indicating strongly disagree). There
was no middle or neutral category on the scale in order to allow the answers to be
dichotomized, but in computing mean scores 3.5 would be the theoretical
midpoint. Means above that point indicate disagreement, and those below indicate
agreement of some extent or other.
The statements were printed on small cards and were handed to the
respondents with the following introduction: "Now here are some statements that
various M.P.’s and other people have made above government and politics in
general. Would you please read each statement and place it on this agree-disagree
scale where it belongs according to how much you agree or disagree with it."
When he finished, the interviewer placed them in the properly marked pocket of
an envelope for later recording and reshuffling. The procedure followed was
similar to that described in Kilpatrick et al. (1964: ch. 2).
7. For an analysis of the complainants, see Hill (1971b).
8. The statements were arbitrarily determined to elicit basic orientations
about the Ombudsman, and it is contended that they have considerable "face"
validity. They were not scaled in the sense of a technique such as Guttman
scaling.
9. The scores of the negatively stated items three and four of Table 1 and
one through four in Table 2 were simply inverted.
10. The range for this statistic is from -1 to +1 (perfect negative correlation
to perfect positive correlation). Zero indicates no association. The data do not
satisfy the assumptions for tests of statistical significance.
11. On quantitative aspects of interaction, see Hill (1971a).
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12. The findings reported here appear not to be incongruent in significant
respects to those reported in Weeks (1969). That article was primarily based upon
mailed questionnaires sent out while the present research was under way.
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